China’s Soybean Market in 2026
China’s relationship with the global soybean trade is one of the most consequential stories in modern agricultural economics — and in 2026, it has taken a dramatic new turn. The world’s largest soybean importer, responsible for consuming roughly 60–65% of all globally traded soybeans, China set a new import record in 2025, pulling in approximately 106–109 million metric tons (MMT) over the marketing year. And yet, for most of that year, American farmers were almost entirely shut out of the market. A trade war that began under President Trump’s second term caused China to redirect its buying almost entirely to Brazil and Argentina, with the United States’ share of China’s soybean imports collapsing to just 15% by mid-2025 — down from 21% in 2024 and over 60% before the 2018 trade tensions began. Then, in late October 2025, a Trump-Xi summit in South Korea produced a truce, and a sweeping new trade deal emerged: China committed to purchasing at least 25 million metric tons of US soybeans annually in each of 2026, 2027, and 2028, plus 12 MMT in the final two months of 2025 alone. The question now dominating global commodity markets is whether that commitment holds.
China’s soybean statistics in 2026 sit at the intersection of food security, geopolitics, and the competitive dynamics of a global market where Brazil is the dominant force. China’s “No. 1 Document” rural policy blueprint for 2026, released in February, pledged to pursue “broader and higher-level opening-up in agriculture” while also emphasizing the need to “regulate the pace and extent of farm product imports” to protect food security — a dual signal that captures the central tension in China’s soybean strategy. The country must import on a massive scale to feed its population and sustain its livestock and vegetable oil industries, but it is deeply motivated to reduce dependence on any single supplier — especially the United States. That motivation has made Brazil not just a trading partner but a strategic pillar of China’s food security architecture. As 2026 unfolds, the 25 MMT US-China soybean commitment is not simply an agricultural trade figure — it is a barometer of the broader geopolitical relationship between the world’s two largest economies.
Key China Soybean Statistics 2026
| Fact | Statistic |
|---|---|
| China total soybean imports (MY 2025/26 forecast) | ~106 MMT — down 1 MMT from MY 2024/25 (USDA FAS) |
| China soybean imports — marketing year 2024/25 record | ~107–109 MMT — all-time record high |
| China’s share of global soybean trade | ~60–65% of all globally traded soybeans |
| US–China deal: annual commitment (2026–2028) | China to buy at least 25 MMT of US soybeans per year |
| US–China deal: late 2025 commitment fulfilled | China purchased 12 MMT from US in Nov–Dec 2025 (Reuters, Jan 2026) |
| China’s US soybean market share (mid-2025, pre-deal) | Fell to 15% — down from 21% in 2024, 60%+ pre-2018 |
| China’s US soybean imports (Jan–Aug 2025) | Just 218 million bushels — vs. 985 million bushels in same period 2024 |
| Consecutive months of zero US soybean imports to China | Four consecutive months (Sept–Oct 2025 window) during trade war |
| Brazil’s share of China’s soybean imports (2024) | ~71% — dominant supplier position |
| Brazil soybean exports to China (Jan–Oct 2025) | Record 79 MMT — already exceeded all of 2024 |
| Brazil exports to China (Q1 2025) | Record $6.6 billion in Q1 2025 alone |
| May 2025 China soybean imports record | 13.9 MMT in a single month — highest monthly import on record |
| China soybean crush (MY 2025/26 USDA estimate) | 108 MMT |
| China domestic soybean production (2025) | Modest — largely for food use, not feed/crush |
| China soybean stocks on hand (Oct 1, 2025, USDA) | 43.5 MMT estimated |
| US soybean price after deal announcement | Rose to ~$11/bushel — highest level in over one year |
| 25 MMT vs. historical average | Still 14% below the 5-year average of 29 MMT (2020–2024) |
| 25 MMT annual minimum value (at $10/bushel) | At least $32 billion per year to US farmers |
| US agricultural exports to China in 2025 | $17 billion — down 30% from 2024, down 50%+ from 2022 |
| US agricultural exports to China projected 2026 (pre-deal baseline) | $9 billion — lowest since 2018 trade war (American Farm Bureau) |
Source: USDA WASDE (November 2025); USDA FAS Soybeans Data; Farmdoc Daily / University of Illinois (November 17, 2025); American Farm Bureau Federation Market Intel (November 3, 2025 and 2026); Fortune (January 21, 2026); Reuters / Bloomberg (January 20, 2026); South China Morning Post (February 4, 2026); American Soybean Association (August–October 2025); Brazil Secex export data via Farmdoc
The 25 MMT commitment is the headline figure, but its real significance only emerges in context. China consumed roughly 29 MMT of US soybeans per year on average between 2020 and 2024 — meaning the new deal’s minimum is actually 14% below what China was buying from the US when trade was functioning normally. That framing matters enormously for US farmers, who celebrated the deal as a lifeline after the brutal Jan–Aug 2025 period during which US soybean exports to China collapsed from 985 million bushels to just 218 million bushels year-over-year. China’s confirmation in January 2026 that it had fulfilled the 12 MMT end-of-2025 pledge — verified by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent at Davos — provided short-term reassurance. But analysts quickly noted that the purchases were made almost entirely by state-owned entities Sinograin and COFCO, while private Chinese crushers continued to favor cheaper South American supplies. The deal did not change China’s commercial soybean economics — it changed its political soybean economics, which are not the same thing.
The market share collapse tells the longer structural story. In the pre-2018 era, the US commanded 60%+ of China’s soybean import market. After the first Trump trade war, that share stabilized at roughly 21% in 2024 — still significant, but a shadow of its former dominance. During the 2025 trade suspension, it fell to 15% and briefly to near zero. The 25 MMT deal, if honored, would restore the US to a share of approximately 23–24% of China’s total imports — meaningful, but still well below the historic norm. Brazil alone exported 79 MMT to China in the first 10 months of 2025, already surpassing its full-year 2024 total of just under 99 MMT, and is projected to remain China’s dominant supplier regardless of what the US-China deal delivers. The global soybean trade has been structurally reorganized — and 2026 is the year the permanence of that reorganization will be tested.
China Soybean Import Trends by Source Country in 2026
CHINA SOYBEAN IMPORT MARKET SHARE — HISTORICAL SHIFT TO 2026
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
BRAZIL share of China imports:
2024 ████████████████████████████████████ 71%
Q1–Q3 2025 (trade war peak) ████████████████████████████████████████ ~80%
UNITED STATES share of China imports:
Pre-2018 (peak) ████████████████████████████████████ ~60%
2024 █████████ 21%
Mid-2025 (trade war low) ██ 15%
Post-deal target (2026 est.) ██████████ ~23–24%
ARGENTINA share of China imports:
2024 ████ ~6–8%
2025 (expanded role) █████ Growing
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
| Supplier Country | China Import Value (2024) | Volume / Share | 2026 Outlook |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brazil | $36.6 billion | ~71% of China’s total imports | Dominant; record 2025/26 crop projected |
| United States | $12.1 billion | ~21% in 2024; fell to 15% in mid-2025 | Recovery to ~23–24% under 25 MMT deal |
| Argentina | $2.08 billion | ~6–8% | Expanding role; 10 MMT pre-booked for late 2025/early 2026 |
| Uruguay | $1.03 billion | Smaller volume | Strategic secondary supplier |
| Canada | $642 million | Marginal | Minor role |
| Brazil Jan–Oct 2025 exports to China | Record 79 MMT | Already exceeded all of 2024 | 2025/26 crop could be record again |
| Argentina booked for late 2025–early 2026 | ~10 MMT pre-contracted | Covering US seasonal export window | Food security hedge strategy |
| China domestic production | Modest volumes | Primarily for food use (tofu, etc.) | Beijing promoting yield over acreage expansion |
| Global soybean exports forecast (2025/26) | 188.0 MMT (USDA WASDE Nov 2025) | Up 0.2 MMT year-on-year | Brazil + Argentina driving growth |
Source: World Bank soybean trade data via Fortune (January 21, 2026); USDA WASDE (November 2025); Farmdoc Daily (November 17, 2025); Fastmarkets (September 2025); USDA FAS Argentina Oilseeds Report (November 2025); South China Morning Post (February 4, 2026)
The supplier landscape for China’s soybean imports in 2026 makes Brazil’s structural dominance undeniable. With $36.6 billion in soybean exports to China in 2024 — approximately three times the US total — and a 2025 Jan–Oct shipment of 79 MMT already exceeding the entire prior year, Brazil has positioned itself as not just China’s largest supplier but an almost irreplaceable one. Brazil’s 2025/26 soybean crop — already projected as another record at approximately 171.5 MMT by both USDA and CONAB — will continue to offer China a reliable, abundant, and competitively priced alternative to US beans. The FOB basis strength of Brazilian soybeans in 2025, which ran approximately $2.00/bushel above Chicago futures during the peak summer export window, was striking. Normally, US seasonal supply would have softened Brazilian prices by then — but Chinese demand was so strong and US beans so politically unwelcome that Brazilian basis stayed elevated through the harvest window, benefiting Brazilian producers with unusually high margins.
Argentina’s expanded role as a swing supplier is among the most significant emerging dynamics in the China soybean trade. With nearly 10 MMT of soybean deliveries pre-contracted for late 2025 through early 2026 — effectively covering the period when US beans would typically be entering the Chinese market — Argentina demonstrated that it can serve as a genuine buffer when trade tensions disrupt the usual North American export season. Argentina’s brief removal of its soybean export tax in 2025 — reinstated once revenues hit a $7 billion threshold — illustrated how actively it is managing its export capacity to capture Chinese demand. China’s own “No. 1 Document” 2026 agricultural blueprint reflects this new reality: it explicitly calls for boosting domestic soybean yields while also “actively pursuing broader and higher-level opening-up in agriculture” — language that signals continued engagement with multiple suppliers rather than a return to US-centric sourcing. The diversification that began as a political response to Trump’s first-term tariffs has now hardened into a permanent strategic architecture.
US–China 25 MMT Soybean Deal — Commitment vs. Reality in 2026
US–CHINA SOYBEAN DEAL: COMMITMENT VS. HISTORICAL BENCHMARKS
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
5-yr avg US exports to China (2020–2024): █████████████████████████████ 29 MMT
10-yr avg US exports to China: █████████████████████████████ 27 MMT
Deal commitment (2026, 2027, 2028): ████████████████████████ 25 MMT ← MINIMUM
US share at peak (pre-2018): ████████████████████████████████████ ~60% of China's imports
US share if 25 MMT delivered (2026 est.): ██████████ ~23–24%
US exports Jan–Aug 2025 (trade war): █ 2.97 MMT
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
$11/bushel = ~$11 per bushel futures post-deal; still below break-even for many US farms
| Deal Metric | Data Point |
|---|---|
| 2026, 2027, 2028 annual minimum commitment | 25 MMT per year from China to US |
| Late 2025 commitment (Nov–Dec) | 12 MMT — fulfilled by January 20, 2026 (Reuters) |
| Confirmed by US Treasury Secretary Bessent | Stated at Davos: “They did everything they said they were going to do” |
| Buyers who fulfilled 12 MMT commitment | Sinograin and COFCO (state-owned) — private crushers continued buying South American beans |
| 25 MMT vs. 5-year average (2020–2024) | 14% below the 29 MMT five-year average |
| 25 MMT vs. 10-year average | Slightly below the 27 MMT decade average |
| Minimum annual deal value at $10/bushel | At least $32 billion to US farmers over 3 years |
| Soybean futures response to deal announcement | Climbed to ~$11/bushel — highest in over a year |
| Cash price vs. break-even (post-basis adjustment) | Still below break-even for many US farmers |
| China tariff on US soybeans (pre-deal) | 23% — made US beans uncompetitive vs. South American origins |
| Tariff reduction under deal | China reduced agricultural tariffs on US products including soybeans |
| Phase 1 (2020) deal comparison — result | Delivered $60+ billion in US ag exports in first two years |
| Risk factor: Trump secondary tariffs threat | Threatened 25% tariffs on countries buying from Iran — could include China (Fortune, Jan 2026) |
| US farmer compensation (2025 trade war fallout) | Soybean farmers: $30.88 per acre in federal aid; corn farmers: $44.36/acre |
Source: American Farm Bureau Federation Market Intel (November 3, 2025); Fortune (January 21, 2026); Reuters / Farm Policy News (January 20, 2026); Farmdoc Daily University of Illinois (November 17, 2025); Iowa State University extension; USDA
The US–China 25 MMT soybean deal is real — China fulfilled its 12 MMT late-2025 commitment on schedule, and Treasury Secretary Bessent’s Davos confirmation on January 20, 2026 gave markets and farmers a brief moment of confidence. But the structural nuances beneath the headline number reveal why this deal is a floor, not a restoration. The 25 MMT minimum is 14% below what China was buying from the US even during the post-Phase 1 recovery years of 2020–2024, and it is dramatically below the 60%+ market share the US commanded before the 2018 trade dispute began. The commitment was achieved in late 2025 almost entirely through state-directed purchasing by Sinograin and COFCO — not through commercial market dynamics. Private Chinese crushers, who collectively process most of China’s soybean imports, continued to favor cheaper South American beans even after the deal was announced, reflecting the stubborn commercial reality that Brazilian and Argentine beans often arrive at competitive or better prices once tariffs and logistics are factored in.
The soybean futures price response tells a similarly nuanced story. After the deal was announced, futures climbed to approximately $11 per bushel — the highest level in over a year. But after adjusting for basis (the difference between the futures price and the actual cash price a farmer receives at the local elevator), the resulting cash price remained below break-even for many US soybean producers. Iowa State University agricultural economist Chad Hart highlighted another key vulnerability: the Trump administration’s ever-shifting tariff posture — including threats of 25% tariffs on countries buying from Iran (which would include China) — could undermine the deal at any point, as it did repeatedly in Trump’s first term. For US soybean farmers who lived through the 2018–2020 trade war and watched China systematically diversify away from US beans at record pace, the 25 MMT deal is welcome but insufficient — a minimum purchase commitment in a market that once absorbed nearly twice that volume, now governed by political relationships rather than pure commercial competition.
China Soybean Domestic Production and Food Security Goals in 2026
CHINA SOYBEAN: DOMESTIC PRODUCTION vs. IMPORT DEPENDENCE (2026)
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
China domestic soybean production ████ ~20–23 MMT/year
China total soybean consumption need ████████████████████████████████████ ~125–130 MMT/year
Import dependency (gap) ████████████████████████████ ~105–108 MMT/year
Crush demand (MY 2025/26, USDA est.) ████████████████████████████████ 108 MMT
Domestic stocks estimate (Oct 1, 2025) ████████ 43.5 MMT (USDA estimate)
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
2026 "No. 1 Document": shift from expanding acreage to boosting yields
| Domestic Production / Food Security Metric | Data Point |
|---|---|
| China domestic soybean production (approx.) | ~20–23 MMT/year — primarily for food use (tofu, soy milk) |
| China crush demand (MY 2025/26, USDA) | 108 MMT — feed and vegetable oil processing |
| Import dependency gap | Requires ~105–108 MMT imports to meet crush and food needs |
| China soybean stocks on hand (Oct 1, 2025) | 43.5 MMT (USDA estimate) — exact levels uncertain due to opaque reporting |
| China 2026 “No. 1 Document” soybean policy | Shift from expanding acreage to boosting yields — sign of maturing domestic strategy |
| China soybean food security concern | Heavy import reliance viewed as strategic vulnerability by Beijing |
| Domestic soybeans — end use | Almost entirely food market (tofu, soy milk, fermented products) — not feed/crush |
| China negative crush margins (2025) | State-owned crushers faced negative margins — private crushers slowed purchasing |
| Brazil 2025/26 crop (USDA/CONAB estimate) | 171.5 MMT — another record; ensures China has alternative supply |
| China strategy: soybean meal alternatives | Reducing soy inclusion rates in livestock rations; importing alternative feedstocks |
| Long-term goal | Reduce import dependence while maintaining food security — a structural tension |
| China investment in Latin American agriculture | Ports, logistics, and infrastructure investments in Brazil to secure supply chain |
Source: USDA WASDE (November 2025); American Soybean Association (October 2025); South China Morning Post (February 4, 2026); USDA FAS; Farmdoc Daily; Ukragroconsult
China’s domestic soybean production — running at approximately 20–23 MMT per year — meets only a small fraction of the country’s total consumption needs, and the gap is structural, not cyclical. China’s crush demand of 108 MMT in the 2025/26 marketing year alone dwarfs domestic supply, making imports not a policy choice but a biological necessity for sustaining its hog population, poultry industry, and vegetable oil sector. The government understands this perfectly, which is why Beijing’s 2026 “No. 1 Document” — the first official policy directive of the year, traditionally focused on rural and agricultural priorities — explicitly acknowledged the tension between food security and import dependency. The shift in policy language from “expanding soybean planting acreage” to “prioritizing yields” marks a pragmatic acknowledgment that China cannot grow its way out of import dependency through acreage expansion alone; it needs better productivity from the land it already has.
The opaque nature of China’s actual soybean stock levels adds a layer of genuine uncertainty to every supply analysis. USDA estimated 43.5 MMT of soybean stocks on hand in China as of October 1, 2025, a figure that — if accurate — suggests China could theoretically bridge gaps in US supply using strategic reserves. But as the American Soybean Association noted in its October 2025 analysis, constructing balance sheets for China is extraordinarily difficult because the country’s soybean stocks are not known with any amount of certainty. This opacity is itself a strategic tool: China can appear to be a willing buyer or a relaxed one depending on what it chooses to signal to markets. China’s long-term investment in Brazilian port and logistics infrastructure, its cultivation of Argentine, Uruguayan, and Canadian alternative supply relationships, and its active research into reducing soybean meal inclusion rates in animal feed formulas all point toward a nation systematically reducing its vulnerability to any single supplier — including Brazil — while continuing to import at record volumes. The 25 MMT US deal operates within this strategic context, not outside it.
Economic Impact of China’s Soybean Trade on US Farmers in 2026
US SOYBEAN TRADE WITH CHINA — ECONOMIC IMPACT COMPARISON
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
US ag exports to China — 2022 peak: ████████████████████████████████ $34+ billion
US ag exports to China — 2024: ████████████████████████ $24+ billion
US ag exports to China — 2025: ███████████████ $17 billion
US ag exports to China — 2026 (pre-deal baseline): ████████ $9 billion
US ag exports to China — with 25 MMT deal: ████████████████ ~$32B (soybeans alone)
US China share of soybean exports:
Pre-2018 peak: China bought ~60% of all US soybean exports
2024: China bought ~50% of all US soybean exports
2025 (trade war): China bought tiny fraction — near zero in summer months
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
| US Farm Economy Metric | Data Point |
|---|---|
| US agricultural exports to China — 2022 | Peak of over $34 billion |
| US agricultural exports to China — 2024 | $24+ billion |
| US agricultural exports to China — 2025 | $17 billion — down 30% from 2024, 50%+ from 2022 |
| US agricultural exports to China — 2026 (pre-deal trajectory) | Projected $9 billion — lowest since the 2018 trade war |
| Recovery potential with 25 MMT deal at $10/bushel | At least $32 billion from soybeans alone per year |
| China’s pre-2018 share of total US soybean exports | ~60% |
| China’s share in 2024 | ~50% (about half) of all US soybean exports |
| US soybean Jan–Aug 2025 (trade war collapse) | 218 million bushels — vs. 985 million in same period 2024 |
| Brazil sales to China in same Jan–Aug 2025 period | ~2.5 billion bushels — underscored South America’s dominance |
| US farmer federal aid — soybean rate (2025) | $30.88 per acre (USDA formula, cost of production basis) |
| US farmer aid — sorghum (also impacted by China pause) | $48.11 per acre |
| Phase 2 deal goal (soybeans + sorghum + hardwood logs) | Soybeans anchor commitment; sorghum and hardwood logs included (quantities unspecified) |
| US soybean market diversification efforts | Thailand, Bangladesh, Morocco identified as growing alternative markets |
| Risk of 25 MMT deal failure impact | Corn acreage could exceed 95 million acres if soybean demand doesn’t recover — adding pressure to already below-break-even corn prices |
Source: American Farm Bureau Federation (2025–2026); USDA FAS; Fortune (January 21, 2026); Farmdoc Daily University of Illinois (November 17, 2025); Iowa State University
The economic stakes for US soybean farmers in 2026 are as high as they have been since the original 2018 trade war — arguably higher, because the structural shift in China’s sourcing has had three more years to harden into permanent commercial relationships. The trajectory without the deal was stark: US agricultural exports to China were on course to fall to $9 billion in 2026 — the lowest level since the 2018 trade war low of $14 billion — representing a collapse from the $34+ billion peak in 2022. A fully honored 25 MMT soybean commitment at current prices generates approximately $32 billion in soybean revenue alone, which would represent a near-complete reversal of that deterioration. But the deal requires China to consistently choose US beans over cheaper or equally priced South American alternatives — a commercial decision that may not always align with the political commitment Beijing has made.
The diversification pressure on US soybean growers is real and accelerating. Markets like Thailand, Bangladesh, and Morocco are being actively cultivated as alternative buyers, with measurable progress in each. But none of these markets can absorb volumes anywhere near what China represents — China’s single-country import volume of ~106 MMT is larger than the entire soybean export markets of most individual regions. The corn acreage signal is one of the most concrete downstream indicators: Farmdoc analysts warned that if China doesn’t deliver on 25 MMT and US soybean demand fails to recover, corn acreage could push back above 95 million acres — adding supply pressure to a corn market already trading below break-even for many producers, compressing farm income across two major commodity categories simultaneously. The 2026 soybean planting decisions being made by US farmers right now will reflect their confidence — or lack thereof — that the China deal is real, durable, and commercially sustainable beyond the state-directed purchases that fulfilled the 2025 commitment.
Disclaimer: This research report is compiled from publicly available sources. While reasonable efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, no representation or warranty, express or implied, is given as to the completeness or reliability of the information. We accept no liability for any errors, omissions, losses, or damages of any kind arising from the use of this report.

