Immigration in Canada 2026
Immigration has long been described as central to Canada’s national identity, with the country welcoming more newcomers per capita than almost any other developed nation and building an official policy of multiculturalism into federal law since 1971. Yet 2026 finds Canada at a genuine turning point: after a sharp post-pandemic surge in newcomers triggered rising public concern over housing affordability and service capacity, the federal government has moved to significantly scale back temporary resident admissions while holding permanent resident targets steady, all while a lively public debate continues over immigration levels, integration, and what a multicultural versus more unified national identity should look like going forward.
This report compiles the latest Canada immigration statistics for 2026, covering permanent and temporary resident targets, population growth, ethnocultural and religious diversity data, and the full range of public opinion polling on immigration levels and multiculturalism itself. Because this is a genuinely contested and evolving policy and cultural debate, the figures below draw on multiple credible sources reflecting different parts of the conversation, allowing readers to form their own view of where Canada’s immigration system and social fabric currently stand.
Interesting Facts About Immigration in Canada 2026
| Interesting Fact | Data (2025-2026) |
|---|---|
| Permanent Resident Target (2026) | 380,000, held flat through 2027 and 2028 |
| New Temporary Resident Target (2026) | 385,000, down 43% from 673,650 in 2025 |
| Share of PR Admissions Going to Economic Immigrants (2026) | 63%, rising to 64% by 2027-2028 |
| Canada’s Total Population (2025) | 41.5 million |
| Immigrants as Share of Total Population (2021 Census) | 23% — the highest level since Confederation |
| Canadians Who Are First or Second Generation | 44% |
| Canadians Identifying as a Visible Minority (2021 Census) | 26.5%, up from 22.3% in 2016 |
| Canadians Identifying as Christian (2021 Census) | 53.3%, down from 67.3% in 2011 |
| Canadians Who Agree Multiculturalism Has Positively Shaped National Identity (2026) | 66% |
| Canadians Who Believe There Is “Too Much” Immigration (2025) | 56% |
| Top Source Country for Recent Immigrants (2016-2021) | India |
| Non-Permanent Residents as Share of Population (2024 Peak) | 7.6%, targeted to fall below 5% by end of 2027 |
Source: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), 2026-2028 Immigration Levels Plan; Statistics Canada, 2021 Census; Environics Institute for Survey Research, Focus Canada and Canadian Diversity Study 2026.
As a content writer analyzing this data, the most important theme in 2026’s Canadian immigration statistics is a real divergence, similar to patterns seen elsewhere, between how Canadians feel about multiculturalism as a national value versus the current volume of immigration. A solid 66% of Canadians told the newly-released Canadian Diversity Study 2026 that multiculturalism has contributed positively to national identity, and researchers found that even among Canadians who feel more negatively about immigration overall, a majority still believe multiculturalism benefits the country. Yet at the same time, 56% of Canadians told the Environics Institute’s Focus Canada survey in late 2025 that the country accepts too many immigrants, a figure that more than doubled between 2022 and 2024 before stabilizing in 2025.
The second major theme is the scale and speed of the federal government’s policy reversal. After permanent resident admissions grew nearly 80% between 2015 and 2024 and temporary resident numbers surged even faster, Ottawa’s 2026-2028 Immigration Levels Plan represents one of the sharpest immigration corrections in modern Canadian history — cutting new temporary resident targets by 43% in a single year while explicitly aiming to bring the non-permanent resident share of the population back under 5% by the end of 2027, a direct policy response to the very public concerns reflected in the polling data.
Permanent Resident Immigration Targets Canada 2026
| Category | 2025 Figure | 2026 Target | 2027-2028 Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Permanent Resident Admissions | 395,000 | 380,000 | 380,000 (notional) |
| Economic Class (Share of Total) | 59% | 63% (239,400) | 64% |
| Family Sponsorship | — | 22% (84,000) | 21% (81,000) |
| Refugees and Protected Persons | — | ~15% (49,300-57,000) | 13-15% |
| Francophone PR Admissions Outside Quebec (Target Share) | — | 9% (30,267) | 9.5% to 10.5% by 2028 |
| One-Time Initiative: Protected Persons to PR Status | — | ~115,000 over 2 years | Extends into 2027 |
| One-Time Initiative: Temporary Workers Transitioning to PR | — | Up to 33,000 over 2 years | Extends into 2027 |
Source: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), 2026-2028 Immigration Levels Plan and 2026-27 Departmental Plan.
Canada’s 2026-2028 Immigration Levels Plan stabilizes permanent resident admissions at 380,000 annually, a modest 4% reduction from 2025’s target of 395,000, but a far more significant pullback from the 2024 target of 465,000. Within this total, economic immigrants — skilled workers selected primarily through Express Entry and the Provincial Nominee Program — will account for a growing share, rising from 59% in 2025 to 64% by 2027-2028, the highest proportion in decades, reflecting the government’s explicit prioritization of labour-market-driven immigration over other categories.
Notably, nearly half (48%) of new permanent residents admitted in 2025 were people already living in Canada as international students or temporary workers transitioning to permanent status, rather than new arrivals from abroad. Combined with two significant one-time initiatives — granting permanent status to 115,000 protected persons and fast-tracking 33,000 temporary workers to PR status — this data shows that a substantial share of Canada’s “new” permanent residents in 2026 and 2027 will actually be people regularizing status they already hold, rather than representing a genuinely new inflow of people into the country.
Temporary Resident Reduction Statistics Canada 2026
| Category | 2025 Target | 2026 Target | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total New Temporary Residents | 673,650 | 385,000 | -43% |
| New Work Permits (Total) | 367,750 | 230,000 | -37% |
| New Study Permits | 305,900 | 155,000 | -49% |
| Non-Permanent Resident Share of Population (2024 Peak) | 7.6% | Falling toward target | Target: under 5% by end of 2027 |
| Study Permit Processing Time (India, Philippines, Nigeria) | 8-12 weeks (early 2025) | 14-20 weeks (mid-2026) | Longer waits, tighter approvals |
Source: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), Supplementary Information for the 2026-2028 Immigration Levels Plan.
The single most dramatic shift in Canada’s 2026 immigration policy is the 43% cut to new temporary resident targets, falling from 673,650 in 2025 to just 385,000 in 2026. Within this category, new study permits face the steepest reduction at 49%, dropping from roughly 306,000 to 155,000, a move explicitly designed to address concerns that rapid growth in international student numbers contributed to housing and infrastructure strain in cities like Toronto and Vancouver. Work permit targets were also cut sharply, down 37% to 230,000.
This policy shift has already produced measurable, tangible effects: study permit processing times for applicants from India, the Philippines, and Nigeria — historically Canada’s largest source countries for international students — stretched from 8 to 12 weeks in early 2025 to 14 to 20 weeks by mid-2026, reflecting both reduced processing capacity allocation and tighter approval standards. With the government’s explicit target of bringing the non-permanent resident population below 5% of Canada’s total population by the end of 2027, down from a 2024 peak of 7.6%, this data confirms that Canada’s years-long expansion of temporary migration pathways has been decisively reversed, at least for the near term.
Population Growth and Immigration’s Share Canada 2026
| Metric | Figure |
|---|---|
| Canada’s Total Population (2025) | 41.5 million |
| Population Change, Early 2026 | Decline recorded in the first quarter of 2026 |
| Projected Population Growth Rate (2026) | Flat, for the second consecutive year |
| Projected Population Growth Rate (2027) | ~0.3%, picking up modestly |
| Medium-Term Average Growth Rate Projection | ~0.8% annually, below the pre-2015 average of 1.1% |
| Canada’s Total Fertility Rate (2024) | ~1.25, the lowest recorded in the country’s history |
Source: Statistics Canada; Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO), Demographic Implications of the 2026-2028 Immigration Levels Plan.
Canada’s population growth has essentially stalled heading into 2026, with the Parliamentary Budget Officer projecting flat growth for a second consecutive year as sharply reduced temporary resident inflows offset continued permanent resident admissions. Canada’s population actually declined in the first quarter of 2026, a genuinely rare occurrence for a country that has relied on immigration as its primary growth engine for decades, particularly as the national total fertility rate fell to approximately 1.25 in 2024 — among the lowest recorded rates in the country’s history and far below the replacement level of 2.1.
This demographic reality underscores why immigration carries such outsized importance in Canadian population policy: with natural increase now contributing minimally to population growth, the PBO projects overall growth will average just 0.8% annually over the medium term once temporary resident numbers stabilize, compared to a pre-2015 average of 1.1%. For policymakers and the public debating immigration levels in 2026, this data frames the core tension at the heart of the discussion — a population that would likely begin shrinking without substantial immigration, set against genuine public concern about the pace at which that immigration has occurred in recent years.
Ethnocultural and Religious Diversity Statistics Canada 2026
| Metric | Figure (2021 Census) |
|---|---|
| Immigrants as Share of Total Population | 23% — highest since Confederation |
| Canadians Identifying as a Visible Minority | 26.5% (9.6 million people), up from 22.3% in 2016 |
| Projected Visible Minority Share by 2041 | 38.2% to 43.0% |
| Largest Visible Minority Group | South Asian Canadians (~2.6 million people) |
| Canadians Identifying as Christian | 53.3%, down from 67.3% in 2011 |
| Canadians With No Religious Affiliation | 34.6%, up from 23.9% in 2011 |
| Fastest-Growing Religious Groups (2011-2021) | Sikh (+70%), Muslim (+69%), Hindu (+66%) |
| Top Source Continent for Recent Immigrants (2016-2021) | Asia (62%), followed by Africa (15.6%) and Europe (10.1%) |
Source: Statistics Canada, 2021 Census of Population, Ethnocultural and Religious Diversity release.
The 2021 Census confirmed that immigrants now make up 23% of Canada’s total population, the highest proportion since Confederation in 1867, while 26.5% of Canadians identify as a member of a visible minority group, up sharply from just 4.7% in 1981. This growth has been driven overwhelmingly by immigration from Asia, which supplied 62% of all immigrants arriving between 2016 and 2021, with India alone contributing 247,000 recent immigrants, a 67% increase over the prior census period and making India the single largest source country.
Religious composition has shifted just as dramatically: for the first time, the share of Canadians identifying as Christian fell to 53.3% in 2021, continuing a steep decline from 67.3% just a decade earlier, while those reporting no religious affiliation climbed to 34.6%. Non-Christian religious groups grew far faster than the overall population over the same decade, with Sikh, Muslim, and Hindu populations each expanding by roughly two-thirds or more, reflecting the changing composition of Canada’s immigrant intake. Statistics Canada projects that by 2041, visible minorities will represent between 38.2% and 43.0% of the total population, a trajectory frequently cited by different sides of the multiculturalism debate to support very different conclusions about the pace of demographic change.
Immigrant Concentration and Urban Settlement Canada 2026
| Metric | Figure |
|---|---|
| Share of Toronto CMA Population That Are Immigrants | 47% |
| Share of Vancouver CMA Population That Are Immigrants | 42% |
| Share of Calgary CMA Population That Are Immigrants | 32% |
| Share of Total Immigrant Population in the 6 Largest Metro Areas | ~75%, representing 47% of Canada’s total population |
| First/Second Generation Share of Toronto CMA Population | 80% |
| First/Second Generation Share of Vancouver CMA Population | 73% |
Source: Statistics Canada, 2021 Census of Population; Environics Analytics analysis of Census data.
Immigrant settlement in Canada remains heavily concentrated in a small number of major metropolitan areas, with Toronto’s immigrant population reaching 47% of the entire metro area and Vancouver close behind at 42%. Together, Canada’s six largest census metropolitan areas are home to roughly three-quarters of all immigrants in the country, even though those same metro areas account for less than half (47%) of Canada’s total population — illustrating just how unevenly the effects of immigration, both economic and social, are distributed across the country geographically.
This concentration becomes even more pronounced when looking at generational composition: 80% of Toronto’s population and 73% of Vancouver’s population are now either first-generation immigrants or the Canadian-born children of immigrants, meaning longtime multi-generational Canadian families represent a clear minority in the country’s two largest cities. For anyone examining the “monoculture versus multiculturalism” debate in a Canadian context, this data is central: much of the public conversation around immigration’s social impact plays out very differently depending on whether it is viewed from these highly diverse major metro areas or from smaller cities and rural regions where immigrant settlement remains comparatively limited.
Public Attitudes Toward Multiculturalism in Canada 2026
| Survey Finding (Canadian Diversity Study 2026) | Result |
|---|---|
| Agree Multiculturalism Has Positively Shaped Canadian Identity | 66% |
| Believe Someone Born Outside Canada Is Just as Likely to Be a Good Citizen | ~80% (“eight in ten”) |
| Express Wholly Positive Opinions About Immigration | ~20% |
| Majority Believing Multiculturalism Benefits Canada, Even Among Immigration Skeptics | Confirmed majority |
| Survey Sample Size | 6,818 adult Canadians, surveyed March-April 2026 |
Source: Canadian Diversity Study 2026, Environics Institute for Survey Research and the Global Migration Institute at Toronto Metropolitan University, released July 2026.
The newly-released Canadian Diversity Study 2026, one of the most comprehensive surveys of its kind, found that 66% of Canadians agree multiculturalism has contributed positively to the country’s national identity, with roughly eight in ten believing a person born outside Canada is just as likely to be a good citizen as someone born domestically. Critically, researchers found that even among the roughly 20% of Canadians who expressed wholly negative views about immigration overall, a majority still believed multiculturalism specifically benefits the country — reinforcing that, as in other countries with similar debates, concern about immigration volume and support for cultural diversity as a value are measurably distinct attitudes among the Canadian public.
This finding matters considerably for understanding the current “monoculture debate” in Canada: rather than reflecting a broad public rejection of multiculturalism itself, the data suggests Canadians are drawing a fairly consistent distinction between the country’s founding commitment to cultural pluralism, which remains broadly popular, and concerns about the pace, management, and scale of recent immigration intake, which have clearly intensified. The theme of multiculturalism, diversity, and inclusion also continues to be the attribute Canadians most commonly cite, unprompted, as what makes the country unique, ahead of the land, democratic freedoms, or universal health care.
Public Opinion on Immigration Levels in Canada 2026
| Survey (Date) | Share Believing There Is “Too Much” Immigration |
|---|---|
| Environics Focus Canada (2022) | 27% |
| Environics Focus Canada (2024) | 58% — first majority in over a quarter century |
| Environics Focus Canada (Fall 2025) | 56%, sentiment stabilizing |
| Conservative Party Supporters (2025) | 82% |
| Liberal Party Supporters (2025) | 40% |
| Environics Focus Canada (2023, Pre-Surge Comparison) | Support for immigration levels at an all-time high the year prior |
Source: Environics Institute for Survey Research, Focus Canada public opinion research program, 2022-2025.
Public sentiment on immigration levels in Canada underwent one of the most dramatic reversals in the survey program’s 50-year history, with the share of Canadians agreeing there is “too much immigration” more than doubling from 27% in 2022 to 58% in 2024 — the first time a majority expressed this view in more than a quarter century of Focus Canada polling. This sentiment has since stabilized rather than continued climbing, settling at 56% in the fall of 2025, which researchers attribute in part to the federal government’s own policy response in reducing intake targets.
The data also reveals a stark and widening partisan divide: by 2025, 82% of Conservative Party supporters agreed immigration levels were too high, roughly twice the rate of Liberal Party supporters (40%), illustrating how immigration has become an increasingly polarized political issue in Canada. Notably, researchers at Environics found little difference in these views between first-generation immigrants and Canadian-born respondents, and consistently trace the primary driver of rising concern to housing affordability and system management issues rather than opposition to newcomers’ countries of origin or cultural backgrounds, a pattern echoed in similar debates playing out in other major immigrant-receiving nations during the same period.
Historical Context: Canadian Multiculturalism Policy 2026
| Milestone | Year |
|---|---|
| Canada Becomes First Country to Adopt an Official Multiculturalism Policy | 1971 |
| Canadian Multiculturalism Act Passed | 1988 |
| Immigrants as Share of Population, 1871 Census (For Historical Comparison) | ~16.1% |
| Immigrants as Share of Population, 2021 Census | 23% — highest since Confederation |
| Highest Annual Immigration Rate in Canadian History | 1913, at 5.3% of total population |
| Projected Immigrant Share of Population by 2041 | 29.1% to 34.0% |
Source: Statistics Canada; Government of Canada, historical immigration policy records.
Canada’s relationship with official multiculturalism dates back further than most public debates suggest: the country became the first in the world to adopt multiculturalism as official government policy in 1971, later enshrining it in law through the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988. This half-century-long policy commitment distinguishes Canada from many peer nations and helps explain why survey data consistently shows multiculturalism itself remaining broadly popular even as concerns about immigration volume have intensified in recent years.
Placed in full historical context, today’s 23% immigrant population share is not unprecedented in absolute terms — Canada’s immigrant share was already around 16% in the 1871 Census, and the country recorded its highest-ever annual immigration rate in 1913, when new arrivals equaled 5.3% of the total population in a single year, a far higher relative rate than anything recorded in recent decades. What has changed far more substantially than the overall scale of immigration is the diversity of countries of origin, shifting decisively from predominantly European sources in earlier historical waves toward the Asian, African, and Middle Eastern source countries that now dominate arrivals — a distinction that remains central to how different commentators frame Canada’s ongoing “monoculture versus multiculturalism” conversation heading into the remainder of 2026.
Disclaimer: This research report is compiled from publicly available sources. While reasonable efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, no representation or warranty, express or implied, is given as to the completeness or reliability of the information. We accept no liability for any errors, omissions, losses, or damages of any kind arising from the use of this report.

