US Global Tariff Statistics 2026 | Key Facts

US Global Tariff 2026

US global tariff policy in 2026 has reached a historic inflection point that no economist, trade analyst, or business leader could have fully anticipated even two years ago. What began as a sharp expansion of Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum in 2018 has, by February 2026, evolved into the most sweeping reshaping of American trade barriers since the Great Depression. The US Supreme Court ruled 6-3 on February 20, 2026, in Learning Resources Inc. v. Trump, that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not grant the President authority to impose tariffs — striking down the legislative backbone behind the vast majority of President Trump’s reciprocal tariff campaign. Within hours of that ruling, President Trump announced a new 15% universal tariff on all US imports under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 — a direct and immediate pivot to an alternative legal authority that sent shockwaves through global markets, trading partner capitals, and US import-dependent industries. Trump’s 15% universal tariff announcement is now the single most consequential active trade policy development of 2026, threatening to restore — and possibly exceed — the tariff burden that the Supreme Court had just struck down, while simultaneously testing the outer limits of a legal authority that has never been used at this scale in American history.

The economic ripple effects of US tariff statistics in 2026 are far-reaching and deeply data-driven. US Customs and Border Protection collected $287 billion in customs duties, taxes, and fees in calendar year 2025 — a staggering 192% increase over the $79 billion collected in calendar year 2024. Even after the IEEPA ruling, FY 2026 customs duties revenue had already hit $90 billion through December, running 332.2% ahead of the same period in FY 2025. Now, Trump’s proposed 15% universal tariff under Section 122 — if fully enacted — would push the US average effective tariff rate back above 10–12% and generate an estimated additional $300–$500 billion in annual tariff revenue, reversing much of the fiscal loss from the SCOTUS ruling and making it the most aggressive single-round tariff action in modern US history. Every major research institution — from the Yale Budget Lab and Tax Foundation to the Tax Policy Center and Penn Wharton Budget Model — has already confirmed that US tariffs are the single largest effective tax increase since 1993, and the Section 122 tariff announcement means that title could be dramatically reinforced before the end of 2026. This article compiles the latest verified US global tariff statistics for 2026, drawn exclusively from official government data and peer-reviewed nonpartisan US sources.

Interesting Facts: US Global Tariff 2026

Sources: Yale Budget Lab (updated Feb 18, 2026); Tax Policy Center Tariff Tracker (Feb 2026); Tax Foundation (Feb 21, 2026); Penn Wharton Budget Model (Feb 3, 2026); USAFacts (updated Feb 2026); CBP.gov official press release (Dec 2025); Richmond Fed Macro Minute (Jan 12, 2026)

The facts above reveal just how unprecedented US global tariff policy in 2026 truly is — and how volatile the landscape remains right now. The SCOTUS ruling on February 20, 2026 was the single most consequential legal development in US trade policy in decades, invalidating the IEEPA-based tariffs that had driven the average effective US tariff rate from 2.7% in 2022–2024 all the way to 11.7% by November 2025. But what makes this moment truly extraordinary is what happened next: within hours, President Trump announced his 15% universal tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 — a deliberate and aggressive counter-move that signals his administration has no intention of stepping back from a high-tariff trade posture. Trump’s 15% tariff announcement is not a fallback; it is a declaration that the tariff war is entering a new, potentially more legally durable phase. If enacted in full, the Section 122 universal tariff of 15% would apply to every product from every country and would generate an estimated $300–$500 billion in additional annual revenue — dwarfing even the Section 232 framework currently in place and pushing the US effective tariff rate to levels not seen since before World War II.

What the facts table also makes clear is the sheer regressivity of the tariff burden across households. A $900–$1,300 average per-household burden sounds manageable in isolation, but under Trump’s proposed 15% universal tariff, that burden could jump to $2,400–$3,800 per household — with the weight falling hardest on the lowest-income Americans, who spend the highest share of their earnings on imported goods like apparel, electronics, and food. The Yale Budget Lab has already found that the short-run burden on the lowest income decile is more than three times that of the top income decile under the current tariff regime. A 15% blanket tariff — the broadest in scope ever announced by a US president — would dramatically amplify that inequality, making it the defining economic policy question of 2026.

US Tariff Revenue Statistics 2026

Sources: USAFacts (Feb 2026); Richmond Fed Macro Minute (Jan 12, 2026); Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (updated Feb 20, 2026); Yale Budget Lab (Feb 18, 2026); Tax Foundation (Feb 21, 2026); Congressional Budget Office

US tariff revenue in 2026 is running at levels that would have seemed impossible just three years ago. The $194.9 billion collected in FY 2025 smashed the previous customs duties record of $111.1 billion set in FY 2022, itself a record driven by the first wave of Trump-era China tariffs. The staggering $97.5 billion collected in Q4 2025 alone — a single quarter — highlights just how front-loaded and accelerated this tariff build-up has been. Monthly collections climbed from $7 billion in January 2025 to a peak of $30 billion by September 2025, tracking in near-lockstep with each new tariff announcement. The FY 2026 figure of $90 billion through December — already 332.2% above the same period in the prior year — signals that even after the IEEPA ruling, the remaining Section 232 tariff framework is generating revenue at historic rates. Now, with Trump’s 15% universal tariff under Section 122 announced on February 20, 2026, the FY 2026 full-year revenue total could shatter every prior record if the new tariffs clear legal challenge and are collected for the remainder of the fiscal year.

The relationship between US tariff revenue and the federal deficit is also worth dissecting carefully. While the fiscal deficit did narrow from 6.9% of GDP in FY 2024 to 5.4% in FY 2025, tariff revenues accounted for only 9.6% of the $1.9 trillion projected deficit — far less than the administration’s rhetoric implied. The CBO projects the deficit will rise again to 5.8% of GDP in FY 2026 even with elevated tariff collections, because the broader macroeconomic drag from tariffs erodes other tax revenue streams simultaneously. But if Trump’s proposed 15% Section 122 tariff is fully implemented and generates an additional $300–$500 billion per year, it would represent the single most significant fiscal revenue action in a generation — potentially reducing the annual deficit by 15–25% in isolation, though economists caution that the GDP-drag and retaliatory effects would substantially offset those gross gains.

US Tariff Rates by Country 2026

Sources: Tax Foundation (Feb 21, 2026); Penn Wharton Budget Model (Feb 3, 2026); Wikipedia — Tariffs in the Second Trump Administration (updated Feb 22, 2026); Avalara US Tariffs by Country Guide (Feb 2026)

The country-level tariff rate picture in 2026 has been completely redrawn by two seismic events that occurred on the same day: the SCOTUS ruling striking down IEEPA tariffs and President Trump’s immediate announcement of a 15% universal tariff under Section 122. The Section 122 tariff — if enacted — would apply to every country and every product, making it the broadest tariff action in US history by design. Unlike the IEEPA tariffs that were country-specific or product-specific, Trump’s 15% Section 122 tariff is explicitly universal — it would hit Canada, the EU, Japan, the UK, Vietnam, and even countries with negotiated deals simultaneously. For China, which already carries a ~30% effective rate from stacked Section 301, Section 232, and fentanyl tariffs, the Section 122 15% addition could push the effective rate to 45%+ — a level that would virtually halt most remaining Chinese imports into the US and accelerate the ongoing economic decoupling.

The Canada and Mexico situation is more precarious than it may appear. While 89% of Canadian and Mexican imports claimed USMCA exemptions by November 2025, legal experts are already debating whether Section 122 — which is a balance-of-payments statute — supersedes USMCA treaty obligations under US domestic law. If the courts hold that it does, Canada and Mexico could face a 15% universal tariff despite their treaty protections, triggering an immediate USMCA renegotiation crisis and likely retaliatory tariffs that would hit American farmers, auto manufacturers, and energy exporters particularly hard. The EU, Japan, and South Korea, which believed they had secured negotiated tariff deals, now face the same uncertainty — their agreements may be rendered moot by a 15% Section 122 blanket tariff that overrides bilateral arrangements.

US Tariff Economic Impact Statistics 2026

Sources: Yale Budget Lab State of US Tariffs (Jan 19, 2026; updated Feb 18, 2026); Tax Foundation General Equilibrium Model (Feb 2026); Tax Policy Center Tariff Tracker (Feb 2026)

The economic impact of US tariffs in 2026 is written across every major macro indicator, and the data is sobering even after accounting for the IEEPA ruling removing the harshest reciprocal duties. The +1.2–1.3% consumer price level increase from all remaining 2025-26 tariffs translates to a real income loss of approximately $1,300–$1,751 per average US household in 2025 dollars — with the burden falling disproportionately on lower-income families, whose spending as a share of income makes them three times more exposed than top-decile households. The individual commodity impacts are even starker: apparel prices are 37% higher in the short run, new car prices have risen by up to $6,000, and food prices are up 3.2% — all of which compound against a backdrop of broader inflationary pressure that the Federal Reserve is forced to navigate carefully.

The long-run sectoral trade-off embedded in these tariffs is perhaps the most underreported story in the US global tariff statistics for 2026. While US manufacturing output expands by 2.9% in the long run — the stated goal of the tariff policy — this gain is more than offset by a 4.1% contraction in construction, a 1.4% decline in agriculture, and an overall permanent reduction in US GDP of 0.3% (equivalent to roughly $90 billion per year in perpetuity). The fact that payroll employment is projected to be 1.3 million lower by end-2026 relative to a no-tariff baseline raises serious questions about whether the manufacturing employment gains from trade protection are anywhere near large enough to offset the broader job losses in construction, services, and agriculture that flow from higher input costs and retaliatory trade measures.

US Tariff Revenue Projections 2026–2035

Sources: Tax Policy Center Tariff Tracker (Feb 2026); Yale Budget Lab (Feb 18, 2026); Penn Wharton Budget Model (Feb 3, 2026); Tax Foundation (Feb 21, 2026); Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (updated Feb 20, 2026); CBO; American Action Forum (Dec 2025)

The single most important variable in every US tariff revenue projection for 2026 is now Trump’s announced 15% universal tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. Every existing score — from the Tax Policy Center’s $904 billion to the Yale Budget Lab’s $2.7 trillion pre-IEEPA estimate — was calculated before February 20, 2026, and none of them factor in the Section 122 tariff announcement. If Trump’s 15% universal tariff is enacted, sustained, and upheld legally, it would generate an estimated $300–$500 billion in additional annual revenue and a 10-year total of $3.0–$4.5 trillion — making every currently published projection dramatically obsolete. The SCOTUS ruling instantly wiped out more than $1.2 trillion in projected decade-long tariff revenue by striking down IEEPA; the Section 122 tariff announcement threatens to add it all back and more. This is the single biggest reason why US tariff revenue statistics in 2026 will look completely different six months from now than they do today.

What makes Trump’s Section 122 tariff so legally and fiscally significant is that Section 122 has never been used at this scale in American history. The statute was designed for targeted, temporary balance-of-payments corrections — not a blanket universal import tax. The 150-day statutory limit embedded in Section 122 means that a 15% universal tariff would technically expire after five months unless renewed — but the Trump administration has signaled clearly that it views the 150-day window as a starting point, not a ceiling, and would renew or stack successive Section 122 proclamations to maintain the tariff indefinitely. Whether courts will permit this interpretation is the defining legal question of US trade policy in 2026, and the outcome will determine whether the Penn Wharton estimate of $323 billion in FY 2026 tariff revenue or the far more modest Tax Policy Center estimate of $101 billion turns out to be closest to reality.

US Tariff Household & Business Impact Statistics 2026

Sources: Tax Policy Center Tariff Tracker (Feb 2026); Yale Budget Lab (Jan 19, 2026 and Feb 18, 2026); Tax Foundation General Equilibrium Model (Feb 2026)

When zooming in on what US tariffs actually cost American households and businesses in 2026, the data reveals a picture that is both more regressive and more economically disruptive than most public debate acknowledges — and that picture is about to get significantly worse if Trump’s 15% Section 122 tariff is enacted. The Tax Policy Center’s estimate of ~$900 average per-household burden in 2026 (post-IEEPA ruling) captures the direct consumer cost of remaining Section 232 tariffs, but Trump’s announced 15% universal tariff could push that burden to an estimated $2,400–$3,800 per household annually — with the steepest increases hitting apparel, electronics, home goods, and automobiles. The full pre-ruling burden of $2,100 per household was already straining lower-income families; a Section 122 universal tariff at 15% applied on top of remaining Section 232 duties would make the current tariff regime look modest by comparison.

The sectoral GDP trade-off represents one of the most important analytical frames for understanding US tariff business impact in 2026. The +2.9% manufacturing output gain is real and measurable — and it is the core argument the Trump administration makes for its tariff strategy. But it is dwarfed by a –4.1% construction contraction driven by soaring steel, aluminum, and lumber costs, and a –1.4% agriculture decline caused by retaliatory tariffs shutting out US farm exports. The $223 billion in US exports already hit by retaliatory measures as of September 2025 could expand dramatically if Trump’s 15% Section 122 universal tariff triggers a new wave of global retaliation — the EU alone has signaled $100–$200 billion in potential countermeasures, and if China, Canada, and Mexico join a coordinated retaliatory response, the net economic damage to US exporters could easily exceed the gross tariff revenue collected under Section 122.

US Tariff Trade Flow & Import Statistics 2026

Sources: Yale Budget Lab (Feb 18, 2026 and June 2025 reports); Richmond Fed Macro Minute (Jan 12, 2026); Penn Wharton Budget Model (Feb 3, 2026); Tax Foundation (Feb 21, 2026)

The US trade flow statistics for 2026 reveal a paradox at the heart of the tariff experiment: despite the most aggressive US import taxes in a generation, the US goods trade deficit actually grew by $25.5 billion in 2025 compared to 2024. The overall trade deficit narrowed by only $2.1 billion — and that was entirely because the services trade surplus expanded, not because goods imports fell meaningfully. This is not what tariff proponents predicted. The $274 billion monthly goods import figure in October 2025 was down just 5.1% year-over-year — a far more modest response than forecast. Now, with Trump’s 15% Section 122 universal tariff announced on February 20, 2026, economists at the Yale Budget Lab project US real imports could fall an additional 7–12% if the tariff is enacted — which would be the most abrupt import contraction since the early 1980s recession and would reshape global supply chains even more dramatically than the 2025 tariff wave.

The structural shift in US import sourcing is undeniable and accelerating. China’s share of US goods imports has collapsed from roughly 25% in 2017 to below 10% in 2025 — one of the most dramatic supply chain realignments in US trade history. The primary beneficiaries have been Vietnam (6.3% of US import share), Malaysia, Cambodia, and other Southeast Asian nations absorbing redirected Chinese manufacturing. But Trump’s 15% Section 122 tariff covers every country without exception — meaning Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia would face the same 15% duty as China faces on its non-stacked tariff categories. This is a deliberate feature of the Section 122 universal tariff design: it eliminates the transshipment advantage that third countries have exploited to circumvent China-specific tariffs, and it signals that the Trump administration views the entire global import regime — not just trade with specific adversaries — as the target of its 2026 US tariff policy.

Disclaimer: This research report is compiled from publicly available sources. While reasonable efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, no representation or warranty, express or implied, is given as to the completeness or reliability of the information. We accept no liability for any errors, omissions, losses, or damages of any kind arising from the use of this report.

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