Pax Silica in the US 2026
Pax Silica is one of the most consequential geopolitical frameworks to emerge out of Washington in years — and if you haven’t been paying close attention, you may have missed just how quickly it has taken shape. Launched on December 12, 2025, at the inaugural Pax Silica Summit held at the Donald J. Trump Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., this U.S. Department of State-led strategic initiative is designed to do something simple on paper but extraordinarily complex in execution: build a trusted, resilient, innovation-driven supply chain for the silicon-based technologies that now underpin nearly every dimension of modern life. The name itself is deliberate — “pax” is Latin for peace, echoing Pax Romana and Pax Americana, while “silica” refers to the compound refined into silicon, the raw foundation of every computer chip and AI system on the planet. As Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg put it plainly: “If the 20th century ran on oil and steel, the 21st century runs on compute and the minerals that feed it.”
In just over two months since that founding summit, Pax Silica has grown from a declaration signed by 7 founding nations into a coalition that now includes 12 member countries as of February 20, 2026 — the day India formally signed the declaration at the India AI Impact Summit in New Delhi. The initiative spans the full technology stack: critical minerals and rare earths, energy inputs, advanced manufacturing, semiconductor design and fabrication, AI infrastructure, logistics, and data centers. For the United States, Pax Silica represents not just a diplomatic achievement but a structural repositioning of American economic security in the age of artificial intelligence. Every statistic, partnership, and investment figure tied to this initiative reflects a deeper truth — that control over the AI supply chain is now inseparable from national power itself.
Interesting Facts About Pax Silica in the US 2026
| Fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Initiative Name Origin | “Pax” (Latin for peace) + “Silica” (compound refined into silicon for AI chips) |
| Lead Agency | U.S. Department of State, under Under Secretary Jacob Helberg |
| Launch Date | December 12, 2025 — inaugural summit in Washington, D.C. |
| Founding Members at Launch | 7 countries signed the Declaration on Day 1 (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Netherlands, UK, Israel, Australia) |
| Members as of February 20, 2026 | 12 nations, including Qatar (Jan 12), UAE (Jan 14), Greece, and India (Feb 20) |
| Observer/Guest Nations | Taiwan, Canada, European Union, OECD |
| Scope of Coverage | Critical minerals → Energy → Advanced Manufacturing → Semiconductors → AI Infrastructure → Logistics |
| UAE Sovereign Fund Assets | Over $1 trillion controlled by UAE sovereign funds (as of 2026) |
| Qatar Investment Authority AUM | Approximately $524 billion managed by QIA |
| QIA AI Data Center Joint Venture | $20 billion joint venture with Brookfield to build AI data centers |
| US Government Intel Stake | U.S. government acquired a 9.9% stake in Intel for $11.1 billion via CHIPS Act grants (August 2025) |
| Stargate Program Size | $500 billion AI data center initiative backed by OpenAI, SoftBank, Oracle, and sovereign-wealth investors |
| US AI Data Center Power Demand Projection | Power demand projected to grow more than 30x — from 4 GW in 2024 to 123 GW by 2035 (Deloitte) |
| Pax Silica Declaration Status | Non-binding declaration of strategic intent; coordinated by the U.S. State Department |
| China’s Role | Not named, but initiative widely understood as countering China’s leverage over rare earth minerals and chip supply chains |
Source: U.S. Department of State (state.gov), Wikipedia — Pax Silica, Rest of World, CNBC, BusinessToday, Deloitte Insights (2026)
The facts above tell a story that goes far beyond simple diplomatic housekeeping. The speed with which Pax Silica expanded — from 7 founding nations in December 2025 to 12 member countries by February 20, 2026 — reflects an urgency that Washington’s traditional alliance-building rarely shows. What makes this initiative particularly remarkable is the financial firepower it has assembled without writing a single binding contract. The Qatar Investment Authority’s $524 billion in assets under management and the UAE’s sovereign funds controlling over $1 trillion give the coalition access to capital at a scale that few multilateral bodies have ever commanded. The $20 billion joint venture between QIA and Brookfield for AI data center construction is already a concrete example of what Pax Silica can mobilize — and it’s just the beginning.
The domestic U.S. data points are equally striking. The projection that AI data center power demand in the United States will grow from 4 gigawatts in 2024 to 123 gigawatts by 2035 — a more than 30-fold increase — puts into sharp relief exactly why Washington treats semiconductor and energy supply chains as national security imperatives. The U.S. government’s decision to take a 9.9% equity stake in Intel worth $11.1 billion using CHIPS Act grants signals that this is no longer purely an industrial policy debate; it is an exercise in state-directed economic strategy on a scale not seen since World War II mobilization. Every number in the table above reflects a Washington that has decided the AI era is too important to leave entirely to market forces.
Pax Silica Member Nations and US Strategic Role in 2026
| Country | Date Signed | Key Contribution to Pax Silica | Strategic Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | Dec 12, 2025 | Leadership, advanced AI chips, Stargate ($500B), CHIPS Act | Coalition organizer, technology standard-setter |
| Japan | Dec 12, 2025 | Semiconductor manufacturing, equipment suppliers, materials | Advanced node R&D, supply chain depth |
| South Korea | Dec 12, 2025 | Memory chips (Samsung, SK Hynix), chip packaging | HBM and DRAM manufacturing leader |
| Singapore | Dec 12, 2025 | Advanced manufacturing hub, logistics, data centers | Regional AI infrastructure anchor |
| Netherlands | Dec 12, 2025 | ASML — controls global EUV lithography bottleneck | Critical machinery for all advanced chip fabs |
| United Kingdom | Dec 12, 2025 | AI software, cybersecurity, financial services | Frontier AI development and regulation |
| Israel | Dec 12, 2025 | AI software, cybersecurity, chip design | Deep AI R&D, US-Israel Strategic AI Partnership (Jan 16, 2026) |
| Australia | Dec 12, 2025 | Critical minerals: lithium, rare earths | Raw material supply chain anchor |
| Qatar | Jan 12, 2026 | Qatar Investment Authority: ~$524B AUM; cheap energy | Capital provider, AI data center energy |
| UAE | Jan 14, 2026 | Sovereign funds >$1T; MGX AI investment fund; 500K advanced AI chips/year access | Capital and energy for AI infrastructure |
| Greece | Jan 2026 | Logistics, maritime trade routes | Supply chain connectivity |
| India | Feb 20, 2026 | Semiconductor Mission (10 plants approved), large tech talent pool | Manufacturing scale-up, AI talent base |
Source: U.S. Department of State (state.gov/pax-silica), CNBC (Feb 18, 2026), BusinessToday (Feb 20, 2026), Business Standard (Jan 26, 2026), Rest of World (Jan 2026)
The member nation table above reveals the careful architecture behind Pax Silica’s coalition design. This is not a group assembled by geography or old alliance structures alone — it is a functional supply chain coalition where each member fills a specific gap in the global AI stack. The Netherlands brings arguably the most strategically irreplaceable asset of all: ASML, the only company on Earth capable of manufacturing the extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines required to produce the world’s most advanced chips. Without ASML machines, there are no cutting-edge semiconductors — period. That single fact explains why the Netherlands was a founding signatory on December 12, 2025, even as the broader EU remains only a guest observer. Meanwhile, Australia’s inclusion is fundamentally about lithium and rare earth minerals — the raw material inputs that feed the entire chip manufacturing process upstream.
India’s formal accession on February 20, 2026 is widely described by U.S. officials as the coalition’s most significant expansion since launch. India brings scale that most other Pax Silica members simply cannot match — a domestic market of 1.4 billion people, a technology workforce of millions, and an active India Semiconductor Mission with 10 semiconductor plants approved and investment commitments worth over ₹1.6 trillion. For Washington, India’s membership also represents a geopolitical coup: bringing a BRICS member and the world’s most populous democracy firmly into the US-led AI supply chain order. The US-India interim trade deal announced in January 2026, which reduced tariffs on Indian imports from 25% to 18%, was widely seen as a diplomatic down payment on India’s eventual Pax Silica accession.
US Semiconductor Industry Statistics in 2026 (Pax Silica Context)
| Metric | 2024 Data | 2026 Data/Projection | Growth Rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global Semiconductor Market Revenue | ~$627B | ~$975 billion | +26% YoY in 2026 |
| Top 10 Global Chip Company Market Cap | $6.5 trillion (Dec 2024) | $9.5 trillion (Dec 2025) | +46% YoY |
| AI Data Center Semiconductor Revenue Growth | +44% (Q2 2025) | +33% projected in 2026 | Sustained boom |
| Computing & Data Storage Segment Revenue | ~$350B est. | >$500 billion (+41.4% YoY) | Fastest growing segment |
| HBM (High Bandwidth Memory) Sales | $15.2 billion | $32.6 billion | +21.7% CAGR through 2028 |
| AI GPU Market Share — Nvidia | ~70–90% | 70–95% estimated | Dominant |
| Hyperscaler Capex (Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Meta combined) | ~$200B est. | ~$500 billion (2026) | Historic high |
| Amazon AI Infrastructure Capex | ~$60B est. | ~$100 billion | |
| Microsoft AI Capex | ~$50B est. | ~$80 billion | |
| Alphabet (Google) AI Capex | ~$50B est. | ~$180 billion (doubled) | |
| Meta AI Capex | ~$35B est. | ~$65 billion | |
| AI Infrastructure Spending (Broader Market) | ~$250B | ~$490 billion | Near doubling |
| US AI Data Centers — Power Demand | 4 GW | Projected 123 GW by 2035 | +3,000% |
| US Data Center Construction Spending (Monthly Peak) | — | $40 billion/month (Bank of America, mid-2025) | +30% YoY |
Source: Deloitte Insights 2026 Semiconductor Outlook, Semiconductor Digest (“The $7 Trillion AI Supercycle”), Motley Fool (Oct 2025, Feb 2026), Sourceability (2026), Bank of America via USFunds
The semiconductor market numbers in the table above are staggering by any historical measure, and they provide the economic foundation that makes Pax Silica not just strategically desirable but financially urgent. The global semiconductor industry reaching $975 billion in annual sales in 2026 — a figure that seemed unthinkable a decade ago — is being driven almost entirely by the AI infrastructure boom. Deloitte’s analysis is blunt: while AI chips now account for roughly half of total industry revenue, they represent less than 0.2% of total chip unit volume. This extreme concentration of value in a tiny slice of production is exactly the kind of structural vulnerability that Pax Silica is designed to address. A disruption in advanced chip supply — whether from geopolitical friction, a natural disaster in Taiwan, or an export control escalation — would cascade through the entire US AI economy almost instantly.
The hyperscaler capex figures deserve special attention because they reveal just how real this spending wave actually is. Alphabet alone doubled its capital expenditure to $180 billion in 2026, a figure that would have seemed absurd as recently as 2023. Combined, the four largest US tech hyperscalers — Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Meta — are spending approximately $500 billion in 2026 on AI infrastructure, with a significant portion flowing into semiconductors, data centers, and the energy systems that power them. This is precisely why the US Department of State, under the Pax Silica framework, has directed American diplomats worldwide to identify and facilitate AI infrastructure projects among coalition partners — Washington wants to ensure that at least a substantial portion of this historic capital deployment happens within trusted supply chains rather than through components or infrastructure connected to countries of concern.
US CHIPS Act and Domestic Semiconductor Reshoring Statistics in 2026
| Metric | Value/Detail |
|---|---|
| CHIPS and Science Act Total Funding | $280 billion (passed July 27, 2022) |
| CHIPS Act Manufacturing Subsidies and Tax Credits | $52 billion |
| CHIPS Act R&D (AI, Quantum, Robotics) | $200 billion |
| Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing Tax Credit Increase | Additional +10 percentage points added by Trump administration (2025) |
| US Government Stake in Intel | 9.9% equity acquired for $11.1 billion in CHIPS Act grants (August 2025) |
| Nvidia Investment in Intel | $5 billion investment announced (2025–2026) |
| Intel Facility Investment (4 states) | $8.5 billion in domestic manufacturing facilities |
| TSMC Arizona Additional Investment | $100 billion more announced (March 2025), including new fabs, packaging, research |
| TSMC Advanced Node Yield Rate | ~90% at 3nm node |
| Samsung Advanced Node Yield Rate | ~50% at comparable node |
| US–Taiwan Semiconductor Trade Deal | Signed January 15, 2026 — tariff cap on Taiwan exports reduced from 20% to 15% for chipmakers expanding US production |
| Tariff Relief for US-Expanding Fabs | Chipmakers expanding US production qualify for 0% import tariffs on semiconductors and manufacturing equipment |
| Private Investment Catalyzed by CHIPS + IRA + IIJA | $449 billion in electronics/semiconductors alone (as of Jan 2025) |
| CHIPS Program Office Grants + Contracts | 2,455 grants, 25 contracts in first two years; $8.15 billion in private capital incentivized |
Source: Wikipedia — CHIPS and Science Act, Sourceability (2026), Stanford HAI (CHIPS Act AI explainer), SIA (Semiconductor Industry Association), Motley Fool
The CHIPS Act statistics reveal the sheer scale of the U.S. government’s commitment to reshoring semiconductor manufacturing — a commitment that Pax Silica is now designed to extend and amplify on a multilateral basis. The decision to add an extra 10 percentage points to the advanced semiconductor manufacturing tax credit, combined with the government’s unprecedented decision to take a 9.9% equity stake in Intel — worth $11.1 billion — signals that the Trump administration has effectively embraced state-directed industrial policy at a scale previously associated more with East Asian competitors than with Washington. The TSMC Arizona commitment of an additional $100 billion in March 2025 is particularly significant: it represents one of the largest single foreign direct investments in US manufacturing history, and it is happening explicitly within the geopolitical architecture that Pax Silica is building.
The US–Taiwan trade agreement signed on January 15, 2026 — just weeks after the inaugural Pax Silica summit — is not coincidental. The deal’s structure, offering 0% tariffs on semiconductors and manufacturing equipment for companies that expand US production while capping broad Taiwanese export duties at 15%, reflects exactly the incentive architecture that Pax Silica is meant to institutionalize: rewarding partners who invest in the US-led supply chain with preferential market access and regulatory relief. The $449 billion in private electronics and semiconductor investment catalyzed by U.S. legislation as of January 2025 demonstrates that the strategy is working — and with Pax Silica now adding a multilateral diplomatic layer to existing domestic incentives, the combined pressure on global supply chains to reorganize around trusted partners is becoming very difficult to resist.
Pax Silica and the US AI Supply Chain: Key Economic Data in 2026
| Metric | Data Point | Source/Context |
|---|---|---|
| Global AI Semiconductor Revenue Growth (2025) | +22% | Deloitte, 2026 Semiconductor Outlook |
| Global AI Semiconductor Revenue Growth (2026 projected) | +26% | Deloitte, 2026 Semiconductor Outlook |
| Projected Global Semiconductor Revenue by 2036 | ~$2 trillion | Deloitte projection |
| Stargate AI Data Center Program | $500 billion over ~5 years (OpenAI, SoftBank, Oracle) | Semiconductor Digest |
| Oracle–OpenAI Cloud Contract | $300 billion computing deal | USFunds |
| AI Accelerator (GPU) Market (2024) | <$100 billion | Creative Strategies / Tom’s Hardware |
| AI Accelerator Market Projection (2029–2030) | $300–$350 billion | Creative Strategies |
| AI Server Market (2024) | ~$140 billion | Tom’s Hardware |
| AI Server Market Projection (2030) | ~$850 billion | Tom’s Hardware |
| Nvidia 5-Year AI Infrastructure Opportunity Estimate | $3–4 trillion | Nvidia Q2 2026 earnings call |
| Data Center Memory Chip Consumption (2026) | ~70% of all memory chips made globally | Tom’s Hardware |
| HBM Price vs Standard Server DRAM | HBM costs ~5x more than standard DRAM | UST Insights |
| Memory Price Spike Projection (mid-2026) | Up to +50% price spikes | Deloitte 2026 outlook |
| UAE AI Chip Access (Pax Silica benefit) | 500,000 advanced US AI chips per year | CNBC, WSJ reporting |
Source: Deloitte Insights 2026 Semiconductor Industry Outlook, Tom’s Hardware (Dec 2025), Semiconductor Digest, CNBC (Feb 18, 2026), Nvidia earnings (2026)
The economic data in the table above paints a picture of an industry undergoing what analysts are calling a “giga cycle” — a structural, multi-year demand surge that is simultaneously reshaping semiconductor economics and global supply chain geopolitics. Nvidia’s framing of the next five years as a $3 trillion to $4 trillion AI infrastructure opportunity, stated during its Q2 2026 earnings call, is not marketing hyperbole; it is a projection grounded in committed capital from hyperscalers, sovereign wealth funds, and governments. The fact that data centers alone are expected to consume roughly 70% of all memory chips produced globally in 2026 illustrates how completely the AI infrastructure buildout has reorganized the semiconductor industry’s demand structure — a shift that is driving the memory price spike projections of up to 50% by mid-2026 that Deloitte flagged in its semiconductor outlook.
The UAE’s access to 500,000 advanced US AI chips per year — one of the concrete benefits reportedly extended as part of its accession to Pax Silica — is particularly telling because it quantifies exactly what membership in this coalition is worth in practical terms. Access to cutting-edge AI semiconductors has become one of the most coveted commodities on Earth, and Washington is using that access as both a carrot and a structuring mechanism for its new technology alliance order. The $500 billion Stargate program and the $300 billion Oracle–OpenAI computing contract are not just domestic spending stories — they are the demand anchors that give the entire Pax Silica supply chain framework its underlying economic logic. Every chip fabricated, every data center built, and every critical mineral extracted within the coalition’s network feeds, ultimately, into satisfying this historic wave of AI infrastructure investment.
Pax Silica Timeline and US Leadership: Key Milestones in 2026
| Date | Milestone | US Action / Significance |
|---|---|---|
| December 11, 2025 | Pre-summit at Donald J. Trump Institute of Peace | Under Secretary Helberg announces Pax Silica framework |
| December 12, 2025 | Inaugural Pax Silica Summit, Washington D.C. | 7 nations sign declaration; US, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Netherlands, UK, Israel, Australia |
| December 16, 2025 | Virtual Press Briefing — Jacob Helberg | US publicly launches AI supply chain security framework |
| January 5, 2026 | Digital Press Briefing | Helberg outlines expansion strategy; “coalition of capabilities” framing |
| January 12, 2026 | Qatar signs Pax Silica Declaration | Gulf capital ($524B QIA) formally enters coalition |
| January 14, 2026 | UAE signs Pax Silica Declaration | UAE sovereign funds (>$1T) + 500K chips/year deal |
| January 15, 2026 | US–Taiwan Semiconductor Trade Deal signed | Tariff cap at 15% for Taiwan; 0% for US-expanding fabs |
| January 16, 2026 | US–Israel Joint Statement on AI & Critical Technologies | Pax Silica bilateral AI framework formalized |
| January 27, 2026 | Joint Statement: Pax Silica Declaration & US–Taiwan Economic Security Cooperation | Deepens Taiwan’s observer relationship |
| January 29, 2026 | Helberg remarks at Hudson Institute | Public articulation of Pax Silica as G7-equivalent for AI era |
| February 20, 2026 | India formally signs at India AI Impact Summit, New Delhi | India becomes 12th member; signed by Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw + Helberg |
Source: U.S. Department of State (state.gov/pax-silica), Business Standard (Feb 20, 2026), CNBC (Feb 18, 2026), Sourceability (2026)
The Pax Silica timeline reveals a pace of diplomatic activity that is genuinely unprecedented for an economic security initiative of this scope. From the inaugural summit on December 12, 2025, to India’s formal accession on February 20, 2026, the coalition added five new members in just 10 weeks — including two of the world’s wealthiest sovereign wealth fund nations, a formal bilateral AI technology partnership with Israel, and a comprehensive semiconductor trade framework with Taiwan. Under Secretary Jacob Helberg has described Pax Silica as the G7-equivalent for the AI era, and the timeline above shows that he and the State Department are moving with that level of ambition. The directive issued by Helberg to all U.S. diplomatic posts worldwide — to identify and operationalize AI infrastructure projects within coalition partner countries — transformed every US embassy into a node in the Pax Silica supply chain network.
India’s signature on February 20, 2026 deserves particular emphasis because of what it signals about the initiative’s trajectory. When India’s Opposition Congress party criticized the government in December 2025 for being excluded from the original nine-nation bloc, it reflected a widely shared assessment that Pax Silica membership carries real economic and strategic stakes. India’s accession comes with concrete domestic momentum: 10 semiconductor plants approved under the India Semiconductor Mission, ₹1.6 trillion in approved investment, and 2-nanometer chip design work already underway — facts highlighted by Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw at the signing ceremony. Washington, for its part, described India’s formal entry as its “biggest win yet” in the race to shape who has access to advanced AI semiconductors and infrastructure — a frank acknowledgment that Pax Silica is as much about geopolitical leverage as it is about economic cooperation.
US Critical Minerals and Supply Chain Diversification Under Pax Silica in 2026
| Metric / Data Point | Value / Detail |
|---|---|
| Taiwan Share of Global Chip Manufacturing | ~60% of total global chip production |
| Taiwan Share of Highest-End Chip Manufacturing | ~90% of world’s most advanced chips |
| TSMC’s Share of World’s Most Advanced Processors | ~90% of advanced processor production |
| TSMC 3nm Node Yield Rate | ~90% |
| Intel Manufacturing Gap vs TSMC | Intel described as “years behind” TSMC (Citi analyst, 2026) |
| US Chip Industry China Export Controls | Ongoing; China has responded with rare earth mineral export restrictions |
| China Rare Earth Control | China dominates global rare earth processing; key for semiconductors |
| Australia’s Role in Coalition | Primary supplier of lithium and rare earths for Pax Silica partners |
| ASML (Netherlands) — EUV Machine Monopoly | Only manufacturer globally of EUV lithography machines for advanced chips |
| US CHIPS Act Private Investment (Electronics/Semiconductors) | $449 billion catalyzed as of January 2025 |
| Taiwan Semiconductor Deal Tariff Reduction | From 20% to 15% broad export cap; 0% for US-manufacturing-expanding fabs |
| Bosch US Fab — First Chips | Expected 2026 from 200mm wafer facility in Roseville (CHIPS-funded) |
| GlobalWafers — First US 300mm Wafer Fab | First-ever 300mm silicon wafer manufacturing facility in the US (Sherman, TX) |
| Projected AI Data Center Power Growth | 4 GW (2024) → 123 GW (2035) — Deloitte estimate for US |
Source: Data Center Dynamics (Dec 2025), Sourceability (2026), Motley Fool (Feb 2026), Wikipedia — CHIPS and Science Act, Deloitte Insights 2026
The critical minerals and supply chain data above expose the single most acute vulnerability that Pax Silica was built to address. Taiwan’s control of approximately 60% of global chip manufacturing — and roughly 90% of the world’s most advanced chips, primarily through TSMC — means that any disruption in the Taiwan Strait would essentially sever the global AI supply chain overnight. This is not a theoretical risk; it is the existential supply chain concentration problem that Washington has been wrestling with since the 2021 chip shortage, and it is the core reason why Pax Silica was constructed to span the entire stack from raw mineral extraction through final chip fabrication. Australia’s inclusion as a critical minerals supplier, the Netherlands’ role through ASML’s EUV lithography machine monopoly, and South Korea’s dominance in memory chip manufacturing are all deliberate design choices to distribute the coalition’s supply chain capabilities across multiple geographies and reduce single points of failure.
The milestone of establishing the first-ever 300mm silicon wafer manufacturing facility in the United States — by GlobalWafers in Sherman, Texas, funded through the CHIPS Act — and Bosch’s first US 200mm wafer fab coming online in 2026 in Roseville are concrete proof that the reshoring strategy is producing real results on the ground. These are not announcements or preliminary agreements; they are operational milestones. Combined with the $449 billion in private sector electronics and semiconductor investment catalyzed by U.S. legislative action, and with Pax Silica now providing a multilateral diplomatic scaffold that reinforces these domestic investments with allied commitments, the US semiconductor supply chain is undergoing a structural transformation that will take years to fully materialize but whose foundations are clearly being laid in 2026.
Disclaimer: This research report is compiled from publicly available sources. While reasonable efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, no representation or warranty, express or implied, is given as to the completeness or reliability of the information. We accept no liability for any errors, omissions, losses, or damages of any kind arising from the use of this report.

